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Supreme Court Voting Behavior:
2002 Term
By RICHARD G. WILKINS,* SCOTT WORTHINGTON,**
SARA BECKER, *** LORIANNE UPDIKE****
I. Introduction
This Study, the seventeenth in a series,' tabulates and analyzes
the voting behavior of the United States Supreme Court during the
2
2002 Term. The analysis is designed to determine whether individual
Justices and the Court as a whole are voting more "conservatively,"
more "liberally," or about the same when compared with past Terms.
As in politics, whether a judicial trend is "conservative" or "liberal"
* Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.
** J.D., J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 1999.
*** J.D., J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 2004.
**** J.D. Candidate, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 2005.
1. Professor Robert E. Riggs began this Study with Supreme Court Voting Behavior:
1986 Term, 2 BYU J. PUB. L. 15 (1988). Professor Richard G. Wilkins continued the
Study in Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1991 Term, 7 BYU J. PUB. L. 1 (1992)
[hereinafter 1991 Study]. The last nine Studies, analyzing the 1993 to 2001 terms, have
been published in the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly. See Richard G. Wilkins et
al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1993 Term, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 269 (1995)
[hereinafter 1993 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1994
Term, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1995) [hereinafter 1994 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et
al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1995 Term, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1996)
[hereinafter 1995 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1996
Term, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 35 (1997) [hereinafter 1996 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins
et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1997 Term, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 533 (1999)
[hereinafter 1997 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1998
Term, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 423 (2000) [hereinafter 1998 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins
et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1999 Term, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 543 (2001)
[hereinafter 1999 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 2000
Term, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 247 (2002) [hereinafter 2000 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins
et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 2001 Term, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 307 (2003)
[hereinafter 2001 Study].
2. The 2002 United States Supreme Court Term covers decisions made from
November 2002 to June 2003.
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often lies in the eye of the beholder. A lawyer for the American Civil
Liberties Union could well paint an ideological picture of the Court
far different from one sketched by a member of the Federalist Society
for Law and Public Policy Studies.
This Study attempts to remove this subjectivity by applying the
following consistent classification scheme to ten categories of cases
across time: "conservative" votes are those that favor an assertion of
governmental power, while "liberal" votes are those that favor a
claim of individual liberty.3  By tracking the term-to-term
conservative or liberal changes in the voting patterns of individual
Justices and the Court as a whole across these categories of cases,'
and by applying standard statistical tests to the resulting data,5 this
Study attempts to provide reliable information regarding the current
ideological posture of the Court and its members, as well as
conclusions and projections regarding its past and future trends.
Whether any statistical study of a process as complex as judicial
decision-making can be reliable is open to debate.6 But, within the
limitations inherent in an attempt to "number crunch" ideology, this
annual survey offers students and practitioners information that is
useful for assessing how the Court or an individual Justice has
voted-and may vote in the future-in particular categories of cases.
This Term's survey demonstrates overall liberal movement for
the Court, reversing the pattern revealed last Term. Majority
3. There is no single, settled definition of conservatism or liberalism. See generally
M.A. RIFF, DICTIONARY OF MODERN POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES 67-73, 141-52 (St.
Martin's Press 1987) (discussing various possible interpretations of the terms). This
Study's definitions, however, are close to the core ideals of each ideology. See id. at 67
(noting that conservatism "implies fear of sudden and violent change[s], respect for
established institutions and rulers, support for elites and hierarchies and a general mistrust
of theory as opposed to empirical deductions"); see also id. at 142 (asserting that
"twentieth century" liberalism is "compounded of constitutionalism; doubtful[] of
pluralism; certain[] of a belief in the virtues of economic freedom, and less certain[] of a
desire to restrict government intervention in most other aspects of life").
4. See infra Data Tables 1-10.
5. See infra Appendix B.
6. The general reliability of statistical inference depends on random sampling. See
generally ROBERT V. HOGG & ALLEN T. CRAIG, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL
STATISTICS 157-58 (5th ed. 1994); RAYMOND H. MYERS, CLASSICAL AND MODERN
REGRESSION WITH APPLICATIONS 9-11 (2d ed. 1990). The Court's method of selecting
cases is far from random. Rather, it is the result of a conscious decisional process.
Furthermore, reliable statistics generally require large quantities of information to
produce reliable results. As sample sizes become larger, inferences become more
accurate. This Study is subject to sampling bias, both because the sample is not random
and because it is comparatively small. The statistical inferences below, therefore, may not
accurately represent a Justice's (or the Court's) views.
rql .d
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decisions in six of ten categories (Civil/State, Criminal/Federal, Equal
Protection, Statutory Civil Rights, Federalism and Swing-Vote)
indicate varying degrees of liberal movement. Some of this
movement may be notable. Three categories-Civil/State,
Criminal/Federal and Federalism-are among this Study's most
reliable indicators of ideological bias.
7 For example, the Civil/State
category, the Study's second most reliable indicator of
liberal/conservative bias,8 demonstrates nearly a 17-point decrease in
the Court's support of state government claims.
9  Similarly, in
Criminal/Federal cases, the Court voted for the government only
33.0% of the time. 10
Liberal movement is confirmed by voting patterns in Swing-Vote
cases. This Term, in close ideologically charged cases, the Court voted
conservatively 56.3% of the time." Last Term, the Court voted
conservatively 68% of the time. This 12-point movement by the Court
demonstrates that liberal coalitions within the Rehnquist Court are
gaining ground, even though the overall outcome of closely divided
cases still tends to be conservative.
This liberal trend is tempered by conservative voting patterns in
Civil/Federal, 2 Criminal/State,
3 First Amendment' and Federal
Jurisdiction" cases. Nevertheless, the conservative movement in
these categories may be less notable than the liberal movement
reflected on other tables. Only one of the categories evidencing
liberal movement, Criminal/State, ranks within the Study's top four
most reliable indicators of liberal/conservative bias.
6
The conservative movement in jurisdictional cases this Term
results in an interesting interplay with the Court's liberal movement
in other categories. In both Majority and Unanimous decisions
involving jurisdictional questions, the Court voted more
conservatively (that is, against a claim to expand federal court
jurisdiction). Thus, a somewhat more "liberal" Court voted
7. See infra Part V.
8. See infra Part V.
9. See infra Data Table 1.
10. See infra Data Table 4.
11. See infra Data Table 10.
12. See infra Data Table 2.
13. See infra Data Table 3.
14. See infra Data Table 5.
15. See infra Data Table 8.
16. See infra Part V.
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conservatively" this Term against expanding its own jurisdictional
17power.
The accuracy of the individual Justices' anticipated voting
patterns for the 2002 Term varied widely. In three categories,
Criminal/State, Equal Protection and Federalism, last Term's Study
anticipated the outcome for Majority opinions with some accuracy.18
The anticipated scores in the First Amendment category differed
most from the Justices' actual scores, deviating by more than 20
points for eight of the nine Justices. 9 This substantial difference is
explained by looking at the past volatility of First Amendment voting
patterns in Majority, Split and Unanimous cases over the past nine
Terms.20
Category analysis, introduced in the 1996 Study and included in
the Study again this Term, indicates that the categories of
Criminal/State, 2 Civil/State," Federalism23 and Criminal/Federal 2' are
the best indicators of the conservative/liberal predilections of the
Justices. The remaining categories-including First Amendment,2
Jurisdiction,2 Statutory Civil Rights,27 Civil/Federalu and Equal
Protection29 cases-are less reliable indicators of the Justices'
ideological propensities.'
Frontier analysis revealed a few interesting changes. Justice
Thomas moved into the top spot on the Conservative Frontier, with a
super-efficient score of 118.0%, displacing Chief Justice Rehnquist as
the most conservative Justice for the Term.31 Justice Thomas was the
only Justice on the Conservative Frontier to record a super-efficient
score above 100.0%. On the other end of the spectrum, Justice
17. See infra Data Table 8.
18. See infra Data Tables 3, 6, 9.
19. See infra Data Table 5. Justice Stevens' anticipated score deviated the least, at -
16.4 points. Justice Kennedy's score deviated the most, at -75.1 points.
20. See infra Data Table 5.
21. See infra Data Table 3.
22. See infra Data Table 1.
23. See infra Data Table 9.
24. See infra Data Table 4.
25. See infra Data Table 5.
26. See infra Data Table 8.
27. See infra Data Table 7.
28. See infra Data Table 2.
29. See infra Data Table 6.
30. See infra Part V.
31. See infra Frontier Analysis Table 1; see also 2000 Study, supra note 1, at 251.
r'ql .a
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Stevens remained in the top spot on the Liberal Frontier, with a
super-efficient score of 109.0%.32 Justice Ginsburg took the second
spot on the Liberal Frontier, with a super-efficient score of 108%.
Justice Breyer followed in third place, with a super-efficient score of
107.0%.
This Study is divided into sections to make the information more
accessible. The precise details of the statistical analysis-as can be
gleaned from a glance at the equations and explanations in Appendix
B-are hardly the topic of light social conversation. However, one
need not have an advanced degree in mathematics to understand the
general trends that flow from the Study's analysis. Part II gives a
description of the mode of analysis employed by the Study. Part III
follows with a general overview of this Term's findings. Part IV sets
out the Study's numerical tables, graphs, and statistical charts and
discusses-table by table and chart by chart-the information
contained therein. Parts V and VI describe the methodology and
outcome of this year's Category and Frontier analyses, respectively.
Appendices A and B detail the definitions and statistical tests
employed by this Study.
H. Mode of Analysis
This Study is based on the tabulation and mathematical analysis
of each Justice's votes in ten categories. Nine of the categories are
based on the nature of the issues addressed (e.g., First Amendment
and Equal Protection) or on the character of the parties involved
(e.g., state or federal government litigants).33 The tenth category
tabulates the number of times each Justice voted with the majority in
cases decided by a single, or swing, vote.
The first nine categories are designed to detect each Justice's
attitude toward two broad issues underlying most Supreme Court
decisions: the protection of individual rights and judicial restraint.
The tabulation of votes in each category reveals, in broad strokes, the
frequency with which individual Justices and the Court as a whole
32. See infra Frontier Analysis Table 2.
33. The categories are as follows: (1) civil controversies in which a state or one of its
officials or political subdivisions is opposed by a private party; (2) civil controversies in
which the federal government or one of its agencies or officials is opposed by a private
party; (3) state criminal cases; (4) federal criminal cases; (5) First Amendment issues of
freedom of speech, press, religion, and association; (6) Equal Protection claims; (7)
statutory civil rights claims; (8) issues of federal court jurisdiction, party standing,
justiciability, and related matters; and (9) federalism cases.
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vote to protect individual rights' or to exercise judicial restraint.35
From the voting patterns that emerge, the Study determines
whether individual Justices and the Court are taking "conservative"
or "liberal" positions. The Study classifies outcomes that favor an
assertion of government power as conservative and outcomes that
favor a claim of individual rights as liberal. Accordingly, the Study
classifies as conservative a vote for the government against an
individual, a vote against a claim of constitutional or statutory rights,
a vote against the exercise of federal jurisdiction, or a vote favoring
state (as opposed to federal) authority on federalism questions. The
Study classifies all contrary votes as liberal.
This analytical scheme is not perfect. Unanimous decisions,
which constitute a significant portion of all cases decided by the
Court, are included in the Study's calculations even though liberal or
conservative ideology may not have influenced the outcome of such
cases. Unanimous opinions often result when either the law or the
facts, or both, point so clearly in one direction that ideology is not a
decisional factor. Furthermore, concern for individual rights is not
always, or even necessarily, the attitudinal opposite of judicial
restraint.
Despite the difficulties with our classification scheme, the basic
assumption that supports this Study-that the general orientation of
34. Votes implicating individual rights are tabulated in tables reporting the outcome
of state and federal criminal prosecutions (Tables 3 and 4), as well as those detailing the
resolution of claims based on the First Amendment (Table 5), the Equal Protection Clause
(Table 6), and civil rights statutes (Table 7). The civil cases examined in Data Tables 1
and 2 also involve individual rights, as these suits pit the government against persons
asserting private rights. The federalism decisions tabulated in Table 9 are less obviously
relevant to individual rights because such decisions focus on the balance of federal and
state authority. Nevertheless, in such cases, the practical effect of voting for the state is to
deny federal relief to a party alleging state encroachment upon his or her rights.
35. Jurisdictional questions (Table 8), which exhibit the relative propensity of the
Justices to avoid judicial decisions, are perhaps the most direct statistical evidence of
judicial restraint. Other tables included in the Study, however, also provide some
indication of the individual Justices' (and the Court's) positions on the "judicial
restraint/judicial activism" axis. Judicial restraint is normally identified with deference to
the policy-making branches of government, adherence to precedent, avoidance of
constitutional bases of decision when narrower grounds exist, respect for the Framers'
intent when construing constitutional text, and avoidance of issues rendered unnecessary
by the doctrines of ripeness, mootness, political questions, etc. As a result, a vote in favor
of individual rights claims (Tables 1-7) may provide some indication of "judicial activism"
because judicial recognition of individual rights often requires the Court to overturn
precedent or invalidate an existing statute. Federalism issues (Table 9) are also relevant
because judicial restraint is traditionally identified with respect for the role of the states
within the federal system.
13 :
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individual Justices and the Court regarding individual rights and
judicial restraint is suggestive of conservative or liberal ideology-
appears sound.36 For example, deference to legislatures frequently
results in rejection of an individual's claim, especially one predicated
upon the impropriety of governmental action. 7 Judicial restraint is
associated with a reluctance to read new rights into the Constitution
or statutes.38 Refusal to exercise federal jurisdiction leaves the matter
to the state courts with their possible bias in favor of state
governmental action and is a clear rebuff to the claimant seeking
federal protection of rights.39 Therefore, to the extent that the Study's
basic ideological assumptions regarding liberal and conservative
outcomes are sound, it is possible to identify trends by tracking the
voting patterns reflected in Data Tables 1 through 10.0
To determine current ideological positions within the Court,
votes of the individual Justices can be compared with those cast by
other Justices this Term, as well as with the outcomes for the
1992-2001 Terms. Likewise, the current ideological position of the
Court as a whole can be determined by comparing present outcomes
of the Court majority with those of prior terms. In Data Tables 1-10,
this information appears in the form of voting percentages for each
Justice and for the Court majority. Charts 1-10, in turn, graphically
depict the voting trends revealed in the tables.
Mean Tables 1-10 and Regression Tables 1-10 analyze the
voting patterns of the individual Justices. The purpose of these tables
36. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. See also infra Part V.
37. See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (holding that the statutory distinction
in 8 U.S.C. § 1409, which imposes different requirements for a child's acquisition of U.S.
citizenship based on whether the mother or father is the citizen parent, is consistent with
Equal Protection).
38. See id.
39. See, e.g., Rivet v. Regions Bank, 522 U.S. 470, 476-77 (1998) (holding that claim
preclusion by reason of a prior federal judgment is a defensive plea that provides no
ground for removal from state to federal court).
40. Of course, the data are only as reliable as our assumptions. The general
assumption that a vote in favor of the government reflects conservative views may not be
accurate in all cases. For example, see Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002),
where the more conservative members of the Court voted in favor of a First Amendment
claim. There, the state's canon of judicial conduct prohibited candidates for judicial
election from expressing their views on certain First Amendment topics, such as abortion.
Id. at 768. The "conservative" Justices apparently valued free speech more than
continued expansion of the abortion right. This is not necessarily a "conservative"
outcome, however. Similarly, in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001), the more
conservative members of the Court voted liberally against the state in order to reaffirm
the importance of economic rights, generally considered to be a conservative value.
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is to determine whether a Justice's 2002 Term voting record departs
in a statistically significant manner from his or her prior voting
pattern and whether any significant correlation exists among the
Term-to-Term voting patterns of the Justices."
In order to calculate the anticipated voting scores of the Justices,
we use an Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA)
forecasting model. 2 The ARIMA model is useful in situations where,
as in this Study, a single variable (a Justice's voting score) is forecast
based only on its present and prior values with no other explanatory
variables.
In order to determine which categories best reveal the
conservative and liberal leanings of the Court, we apply factor
analysis. This analysis tests the extent to which the Justices'
disposition of cases within the Study's categories may have been
affected by liberal/conservative bias. Factor analysis has long been
used by psychologists attempting to identify characteristics of
personality and intelligence. '3 The results of the factor analysis for
the 2002 Term appear in Part V of this article.
Finally, Frontier Analysis Tables 1-4 and Frontier Charts 1-4
compare the Justices' conservative and liberal predilections this Term
and over the course of the entire Study. Frontier analysis mitigates
some of the analytical difficulties previously discussed by measuring
the strength of each Justice's tendencies relative to the rest of the
Court with respect to the cases actually decided in a given Term
rather than against an absolute scale."
All of the data and statistics reported in this Study must be
interpreted with caution. The percentages and statistical results
revealed in each table are affected not only by the dispositions of the
individual Justices but also by the nature of the cases decided each
Term. Furthermore, Supreme Court cases are not the result of
random selection and the universe of votes cast by the Justices is
relatively small. Since both random sampling and large sample size
are crucial elements of any fully reliable statistical analysis,
conclusions drawn from this Study are hardly beyond dispute. There
are obvious limitations to any empirical analysis of a subjective
decision-making process."
41. See infra Appendix B.
42. See infra Appendix B for a more detailed explanation of ARIMA.
43. See infra Appendix B for a more detailed analysis of factor analysis.
44. See infra Appendix B for a more detailed analysis of frontier analysis.
45. See supra note 6.
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In light of these caveats, one might ask whether this Study is
worth conducting or reading. We believe it is. For years, experienced
Supreme Court practitioners have attempted to divine the ideological
leanings of individual Justices in framing their arguments to the
Court. Moreover, both the media and academicians are fond of
attaching ideological labels to the Court and its personnel. Supreme
Court practitioners, legal scholars and the public have long assumed
that assessments of Court ideology are valuable, even though such
assessments may be based upon little more than the gut reactions of
the attorneys, scholars and news reporters involved. This Study,
based upon a systematic methodology for objectively gathering,
quantifying and analyzing data over time, should be more reliable
than these ad hoc assessments.
III. Overview of the Ideological Trends of the 2002 Term
This Term's results, viewed as a whole, indicate liberal
movement, reversing last Term's conservative trend. This year's
liberal movement, however, merely continues a Term-to-Term
"seesaw" pattern of liberal-to-conservative-and-back-to-liberal voting
behavior.46 Overall, the Justices voted more liberally this Term than
last in six out of ten categories. The outcome of closely divided Swing
Vote cases was also 12 points more liberal than last Term, even
though the Court "swung" conservatively 53.6% of the time. 7 This
liberal movement was offset by unprecedented conservatism in
Federal/Civil cases, where the Court voted for the government in
81.8% of Majority decisions.
Data Table 1: Civil Cases-State Government Versus a Private Party.
The Court voted more liberally this Term against state
governments in Majority (16.8 points), Split (25.6 points) and
Unanimous (10.4 points) opinions. Although this category has
historically been the most reliable indicator of conservative/liberal
bias, factor analysis thisTerm drops the category to second place.
This change may be due to the rather unusual rank order displayed by
the Justices. Justice Thomas tops the chart with the most
conservative 2002 voting pattern in Civil/State cases. Somewhat
46. The 2001 Term reflected conservative movement, which reversed the 2000 Term's
slight liberal trend. 2001 Study, supra note 1, at 308. The Court in 2002 again reverses
field.
47.. See infra Data Table 10.
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surprisingly, however, Justices Ginsburg and Stevens are ranked
second and third, respectively, as the next most conservative Justices.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy's voting patterns place
them at the bottom of the chart in the most liberal positions. The
voting behaviors of Justices Stevens and Ginsburg were closely
correlated. Despite the unusual voting pattern this Term, the Study
anticipates that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens will
regain their usual positions next Term at the conservative top (for the
Chief Justice) and the liberal bottom (for Justice Stevens) of Data
Table 1.
Data Table 2: Civil Cases-Federal Government Versus a Private
Party.
Last year's conservative movement on Data Table 2 continued
this Term, yielding an unprecedented vote for the government in
100% of all Split decisions. Votes for the government in Majority and
Unanimous decisions were also high, at 81.8% and 77.8%,
respectively. Chief Justice Rehnquist is again the most conservative
Justice. Justice Stevens moved from his "moderate" position last
Term to the most liberal ranking on the Court. All six Justices with
statistically significant movement moved in a conservative direction.
Factor analysis, however, places this category in eighth place in terms
of reliability. Accordingly, it may not be possible to infer too much
from the table.
Data Table 3: Criminal Cases-State Government Versus a Private
Party.
Factor analysis selects this category as the most reliable indicator
of conservative/liberal bias for the 2002 Term. Data Table 3
demonstrates moderate conservative movement in Majority decisions
(8.8 points), Split decisions (10 points) and Unanimous decisions (5
points). The traditionally conservative Justices hold the top four
positions, with Justice Thomas topping the chart. The traditionally
liberal Justices hold the bottom four positions, with Justice Ginsburg
displaying the most liberal voting pattern on the Court.
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Data Table 4: Criminal Cases-Federal Government Versus Private
Party.
There was significant liberal movement in Criminal/Federal cases
this Term. The Court voted for the government in all cases (Majority,
Split and Unanimous) in 2001. Accordingly, some liberal movement
(that is, the casting of some votes against the government) is hardly
unexpected. The magnitude of the liberal movement this Term,
however, is nevertheless significant. The government prevailed in
only one-third of the Majority, Split and Unanimous decisions
decided by the Court-a low point for the federal government (and a
high-water liberal voting pattern for the Court) unmatched since the
1993 Term." Only one Justice-Justice Rehnquist-voted more
conservatively than expected. The remaining eight Justices voted
more liberally than expected, with surprisingly high liberal voting
exhibited by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Stevens. Data Table 4
displays established conservative/liberal voting blocs, with Chief
Justice Rehnquist holding the most conservative position, Justice
O'Connor in the middle, and Justice Stevens at the liberal bottom.
There is a statistically significant correlation between the voting
patterns of Justices Ginsburg and Souter in Criminal/Federal cases.
Data Table 5: First Amendment Rights of Expression, Association,
and Religion.
The Court continued its generally conservative stance on First
Amendment issues in 2002. Unanimous, Split and Majority decisions
were all decided more conservatively than last Term. Indeed, only
the 1996 and 1997 Terms were less receptive to First Amendment
claims. However, the small universe of cases in this category-four-
renders predictions or analysis based upon the data unreliable.
Data Table 6: Equal Protection Claims.
Data Table 6 demonstrates liberal movement. But, as with Data
Table 5, the number of cases (four) involving Equal Protection claims
was small, rendering the statistical reliability of this category
questionable. The cases, furthermore, evidence notable "pole
switching" (where nominally liberal results evidence politically
48. Lower scores for the federal government on Data Table 4 were recorded in the
2000 Term for Majority (28.6) and Split (20) opinions. 2001 Study, supra note 1, at 331.
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conservative impulses and vice versa). This occurred most markedly
with two affirmative action cases, Gratz v. Bollinger9 and Grutter v.
Bollinger,° in which the plaintiffs asserted that the University of
Michigan's "racial balancing" admissions policy violated the Equal
Protection Clause. In the specific. circumstances of these cases,
nominally liberal votes in favor of the Equal Protection claim-as
well as nominally conservative votes in favor of the government-
may not in fact demonstrate any such ideological motivation.
Data Table 7: Statutory Civil Rights.
The Court demonstrated slight liberal movement in Majority
(13.3 points), Split (16.7 points) and Unanimous (4.7 points) cases
involving Statutory Civil Rights claims. Nevertheless, the outcome in
Majority cases was some 16 points more conservative than the Study
anticipated based on prior voting patterns. The data collected in this
category is unusual because there are only two voting patterns: the
one displayed by seven Justices who voted in favor of Statutory Civil
Rights claims twice and against such claims three times, and the
pattern displayed by Justices Stevens and Souter-who each voted in
favor of statutory claims once, while rejecting such claims four times.
The unusual conservative positions held by Justices Stevens and
Souter at the bottom of Data Table 8 may be explained by this
remarkable voting pattern.
Data Table 8: Cases Raising a Challenge to the Exercise of Federal
Jurisdiction.
In keeping with its conservative trend since 1999, the Court again
slightly decreased its receptiveness to assertions of federal jurisdiction
this Term. Although the Court moved 10 points in a liberal direction
with Split decisions involving a jurisdictional question, both
Unanimous and Majority decisions continued the conservative trend
(with 12.1- and 20-point conservative movements, respectively). The
voting patterns of Justices Ginsburg and Souter on jurisdictional
questions display a high level of correlation.
49. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
50. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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Data Table 9: Federalism Cases.
The Court voted slightly more liberally in Majority (7.1 points)
and Split (7.1 points) decisions involving Federalism questions. This
was offset by a 4.2 point conservative movement in Unanimous
decisions. The voting pattern for Justice Ginsburg was somewhat
unexpected, in that she voted in favor of state authority more often
than the Chief Justice. The anticipated voting pattern for the Court
as a whole was fairly accurate. There is a high correlation between
the year-to-year voting patterns of Justices Breyer and Souter.
Data Table 10: Swing-Votes.
Although conservative coalitions still decided more than 50% of
the closely divided cases this Term, Data Table 10 nevertheless
demonstrates liberal movement. Conservative coalitions controlled
56.3% of the Swing Votes this Term, down 11.7 points from last
Term. Conservative coalitions fared worse in only three of the past
nine Terms. Justice O'Connor is again the Court's most influential
swing voter, voting with the majority 100% of the time, followed by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, who voted with the majority 65% of the
time.
IV. Analysis
Table 1: Civil-State Party
5'
51. Several cases this Term involved disputes where one issue was decided "for"
while another issue was decided 
"against" a governmental party, often by different voting
majorities. This article, for example, lists three cases as "for" and "against" the state. See,
e.g., Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003)(state action may constitute a
regulatory taking-against the state) (despite regulatory taking, no compensation is due-
in favor of the state); Pharm. Research v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (2003) (plaintiff has not
established grounds for a preliminary injunction-in favor of state) (plaintiff may
nevertheless be entitled to relief on remand-against the state); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S.
343 (2003) (a statute forbidding the burning of crosses with intent to intimidate does not
necessarily violate the First Amendment-in favor of state) (Virginia cross burning statute
is nevertheless facially invalid-against the state). Cases collected in footnotes 72, 93 and
122 also appear on "both sides" of their respective Tables. Cases decided in favor of state
governments: Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003); Pharm. Research v.
Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (2003); Ky. Assoc. of Health Plans v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003);
Wash. State Dep't of Social and Health Servs. v. Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371 (2003); Conn.
Dep't of Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003); City of L.A. v. David, 538 U.S. 715 (2003);
Pierce County Wash. v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129 (2003); City of Cuyohoga Falls v. Buckeye
Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188 (2003); Fitzgerald v. Racing, 539 U.S. 103 (2003);
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Data Table 1 and Chart 1 indicate decreasing support on the
Court for state government in civil cases. 2  In contrast to the
gradually increasing support for state governments since the 1997
Term, this Term's data shows liberal movement in "Majority,"
"Split," and "Unanimous" decisions. Split cases are typically the best
indicator of political movement on the Court, and in these decisions
the Court voted 25.6 points more often against state government than
last Term.53 Despite this uniform liberal movement, however, the
Court still decided 52% of Civil/State cases in favor of the
government." This suggests that, despite liberal movement, the Court
remains conservative in its general approach to the cases on Table 1;
the Court has not returned to the liberal data seen in the 1995 Term.
The Civil/State party is this Term's second most reliable indicator of
conservative/liberal leanings.5
Statistically, predicted voting patterns for 1996 were generally
more liberal than anticipated. According to Mean Table 1, six of the
nine Justices showed a statistically significant change in voting
behavior, with four out of the six voting more liberally than
expected. 6 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy had the
highest liberal deviation of 21.0 and 20.7 points, respectively. 7 Justice
Stevens had the highest conservative deviation at 20.3 points.
The rank ordering of the Justices on Data Table 1 is somewhat
unusual this Term, because Justices Ginsburg and Stevens-two
traditionally "liberal" jurists-hold positions near the conservative
"top of the chart." The unusual posture of several cases included on
Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113 (2003); Illinois ex. rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Co., 538
U.S. 600 (2003); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003); Yellow Transp. v. Michigan, 537U.S. 36 (2002). Cases decided against state governments: Brown v. Legal Found. of
Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003); Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003); Pharm.
Research v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (2003); Entergy La. Inc. v. La. Public Serv. Comm'n., 539
U.S. 39 (2003); Hillside Dairy v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59 (2003); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343
(2003); Franchise Tax Board of Ca. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 588 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Jinks v. Richland County, 538
U.S. 456 (2003).
52. See infra Data Table I and Chart 1.
53. See infra Data Table 1.
54. See infra Data Table 1.
55. See infra Part V.
56. See infra Mean Table 1. Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, Scalia, O'Connor, Kennedy
and the Chief Justice displayed statistically significant departures from past voting
behavior. All of these Justices except Ginsburg and Stevens voted more conservatively
than anticipated.
57. See infra Data Table 1.
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Data Table 1, which presented appealing "conservative" resolutions
for politically "liberal" issues, may explain this notable change of
position for the two Justices. For instance, Justice Stevens voted for
the government in Equal Protection affirmative action cases
58 and
First Amendment cases.59 These somewhat unusual cases may
account for Justices Ginsburg's, Stevens' and Souter's ranking as
three of the four most "conservative" jurists 
on Data Table 1.60
There is one notable voting correlation on Data Table 1. Justices
Stevens and Ginsburg hold an adjusted correlation score of 0.96 and
an r2 score of 0.91.61 These scores indicate that the Justices' voting
patterns tend to move in tandem from Term to Term.
Table 2: Civil-Federal Party6
Data Table 2 and Chart 2 show that the Court continued last
year's conservative trend in all three voting categories-Majority,
Split, and Unanimous.63 In Split cases, the Court voted 100.0% in
favor of the federal government.' In Majority cases, the Court
reached an all-time high, voting 81.8% of the time in favor of the
federal government 5  In Unanimous cases, the Court reached its
third highest average by voting 77.8% of the time in favor of the
58. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger 539 U.S. 244
(2003).
59. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 368 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring); Brown v.
Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003).
60. For an example of the Court's unusual voting alignment, see Am. Ins. Ass'n v.
Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (showing that Justices Scalia, Thomas, Stevens, 
and
Ginsburg vote conservatively in this case for a strict construction of the president's
powers). The Court's outcomes in the Civil/State party category this Term also reveal 
a
fractured Court. See, e.g., Pharm. Research v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (2003).
61. See infra Regression Table 1.
62. Cases decided in favor of federal government: Fed. Election Comm'n v.
Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003); Cook County v. United States, 538 U.S. 119 (2003);
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003); Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S. 437 (2003);
Barnhart v. Peabody Coal, 537 U.S. 149 (2003); Nat'l Park Hospitality v. Dep't of Interior,
538 U.S. 803 (2003); United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003); INS v. Ventura,
537 U.S. 12 (2003); United States v. Am. Library Ass'n., 539 U.S. 194 (2003); United
States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71 (2002). Cases decided against of federal government: F.C.C. 
v.
NextWave Personal Comm'ns, 537 U.S. 293 (2002); United States v. White Mountain
Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 456 (2003).
63. See infra Data Table 2 and Chart 2.
64. See 1997 Study, supra note 1, at 540.
65. See infra Data Table 2 and Chart 2.
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government. 66
According to Mean Table 2, all but one of the six Justices
demonstrating statistically significant changes in voting behavior
voted more conservatively than anticipated, which may be another
indicator of a significant conservative movement by the Court in this
category.6' Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy cast votes
90.9% of the time in favor of the federal government, each voting
between 32 and 45 points more conservatively than expected.6
Justice Stevens is the notable exception to the conservative trend in
this category: he voted significantly more liberally than anticipated by
20.7 points.69
Although the Court showed increased support for the federal
government in Civil/Federal cases, the conservative movement on this
table may be unreliable. Factor analysis this Term ranks
Civil/Federal cases as the second least reliable indicator of
conservative/liberal bias.7'
Data Table 2, like Data Table 1, displays some unusual
"reversals" in the usual conservative/liberal ranking of the Justices.
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, traditionally considered to be "liberal"
members of the Court, are ranked this Term in the top "conservative"
half of Data Table 2. This result may simply be an indication of Data
Table 2's low level of reliability this Term. However, as with Data
Table 1, this ranking may result from the nature of the cases before
the Court. In at least two cases this Term, traditionally conservative
Justices invoked the "conservative" interpretive cannon of strict
statutory construction to yield "liberal" results under the terms of this
Study.7'
Chief Justice Rehnquist tops the chart as the most conservative
Justice in Civil/Federal cases while Justice Stevens holds the bottom
position as the most liberal Justice. The Study anticipates that the
Chief Justice will again hold the most conservative position on Data
Table 2 for the 2003 Term.
66. See infra Data Table 2 and Chart 2.
67. See infra Mean Table 2. Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Thomas, Stevens
and the Chief Justice displayed statistically significant departures from past voting
behavior. Only Justice Stevens voted more conservatively than expected.
68. See infra Data Table 2.
69. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
70. See infra Part V.
71. See Boeing v. United States, 537 U.S. 437 (2003); Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co.,
537 U.S. 149 (2003).
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Table 3: State Criminal Cases72
Data Table 3 and Chart 3 demonstrate moderate conservative
movement in favor of the state in Majority, Split and Unanimous
decisions. The Court voted for the government 58.8% of the time in
Majority decisions, 50% of the time in Split decisions, and 80% of the
time in Unanimous decisions.
This Term, state criminal cases emerge as our most reliable
indicator of conservative/liberal bias. As discussed above, the
Civil/State and Civil/Federal Data Tables have emerged as unreliable
predictors of conservative/liberal bias (perhaps due to somewhat
unconventional pole-switching).73  However, and whatever the
explanation for the unusual conservative/liberal rankings on Data
Tables 1 and 2, Data Table 3 returns to the more conventional
ideological divisions generally displayed by the Court, with the five
traditionally conservative Justices topping the chart and the four
traditionally "liberal" Justices on the bottom.
Individually, Justice Thomas ranks as the most conservative
Justice in State/Criminal cases and Justice Ginsburg is positioned as
the most liberal. For the 2003 Term we anticipate Justice Thomas to
return as the most conservative Justice in this category and Justice
Stevens to rank as the most liberal (followed closely by Justice
Ginsburg).
There were no statistically significant correlations in the voting
patterns of the Justices in Criminal/State cases.' The 2001 Study
anticipated the voting pattern in Majority cases rather accurately,
deviating only 2.5 points from the actual score. Justices Ginsburg and
72. Cases decided in favor of the state: Lockeyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003);
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003); Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202 (2003); Price v.
Vincent, 538 U.S. 634 (2003); Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003); Overton v. Bazetta,
539 U.S. 126 (2003); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003); Sattazhan v. Pennsylvania,
537 U.S. 101 (2002); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19 (2002); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3
(2002). Cases decided against the state: Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003);
Lawrence v. Tex., 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003); Miller v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003); Kaupp v.
Texas, 538 U.S. 626 (2003); Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003); Bunkley v. Florida,
538 U.S. 835 (2003); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003). Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S.
760 (2003), involved a question decided in favor, as well as a question decided against, the
state: the state defendant is entitled to qualified immunity (for the state); plaintiff may
nevertheless assert a substantive due process claim on remand (against the state). See
supra note 51.
73. See discussion supra on Civil/State and Civil/Federal Parties.
74. See infra Regression Table 3.
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Breyer voted almost exactly as anticipated, with margins of error of
only 0.3 and -1.6 points, respectively.
Table 4: Federal Criminal Cases"
Data Table 4 and Chart 4 show liberal movement by the Court.'
Majority, Split and Unanimous decisions all moved in a liberal
direction, with only 33.3% of all cases decided in favor of the
government. Liberal movement on Data Table 4, however, is not
unexpected. Last Term, the Justices voted 100.0% for the federal
government in all cases. Accordingly, unless the federal government
had continued an unusual winning streak, some "liberal" movement
this Term was unavoidable.
Nevertheless, the magnitude of the movement appears to be
significant. With the single exception of Justice Thomas, the voting
patterns of all Justices on Data Table 4 showed a statistically
significant change in voting behavior. 7 And, of the eight Justices that
demonstrated a statistically significant change in voting behavior, all
but Chief Justice Rehnquist voted more liberally than anticipated. 8
The most liberal movement was evidenced by the scores of Justices
Scalia and Thomas, who voted 33.2 and 25.9 points more liberally
than anticipated.79
In spite of the general liberal movement, the rank ordering of the
Justices on Data Table 4 is not unexpected. The most conservative
spots on the table are held by the Chief Justice, followed by Justices
Thomas, Scalia, Kennedy and O'Connor. Justice Stevens did not vote
for the federal government a single time on Data Table 4, setting a
liberal "high water" mark for the Justice in Federal/Criminal cases. 8
Justice Ginsburg's and Justice Souter's voting patterns tend to
move similarly over time in criminal federal cases, with a correlation
75. Cases decided in favor of the federal government: United States v. Recio, 537
U.S. 270 (2003); Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510
(2003). Cases decided against the federal government: Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S.
500 (2003); Price v. United States, 537 U.S. 1152 (2003); Clay v. United States, 538 U.S.
522 (2003).
76. See infra Data Table 4 and Chart 4.
77. See infra Mean Table 4.
78. See infra Mean Table 4. For 2002, the Chief Justice voted 9 points more
conservatively on Data Table 4 than last year's Study had anticipated. Id.
79. See infra Mean Table 4.
80. See 1997 Study, supra note 1, 540.
ril1.4
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score of 0.97 and an r2 of 0.94.8
Table 5: First Amendment Claims82
In First Amendment cases this Term, the Court followed a
conservative trend that began in the 2000 Term.g
3 In the Majority
category, the Court voted for the claim only 25.0% of the time, a
conservative shift of 41.7 points from the previous Term, marking the
second lowest score recorded in this category.
84 The Split category
mirrored this shift, favoring First Amendment claims only 33.0% of
the time, a drop of more than 38 points." The Court did not vote for
any First Amendment claims in the Unanimous category.
The Justices' individual voting behaviors further evidence this
conservative shift. Each member of the Court voted more
conservatively than anticipated. Notably, the Chief Justice, along
with Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, did not accept any of the four
First Amendment claims presented to the Court.
86 Furthermore, the
voting patterns of every member of the Court, with the single
exception of Justice Breyer, demonstrated a statistically significant
change in voting behaviorY Moreover, all of the Justices (including
Justice Breyer) voted more conservatively than anticipated."
Individually, Justice Kennedy's score showed a marked decrease
from past Terms. Typically, Justice Kennedy tops the chart in First
Amendment cases, voting most often in favor of First Amendment
claims. His support of First Amendment claims fell 66.7 points from
last Term, the most dramatic movement of any Justice on Data Table
5, marking an all-time low score for Justice Kennedy. Justices Scalia
and Thomas uncharacteristically hold two of the most liberal
positions on the chart.
81. See infra Regression Table 4.
82. Cases decided for the claim: Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). Cases decided
against the claim: Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003); United States v. Am. Library
Ass'n., 539 U.S. 194 (2003); City of Cuyohoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538
U.S. 188 (2003); Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113 (2003); Illinois ex. rel. Madigan v.
Telemarketing Co., 538 U.S. 600 (2003).
83. See infra Data Table 5 and Chart 5.
84. In the 1997 Term, the Court voted 0 times for the claim in the Majority category.
1997 Study, supra note 1, at 540.
85. See infra Data Table 5.
86. See infra Data Table 5.
87. See infra Mean Table 5.
88. See infra Data Table 5.
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The unusual rankings and movement demonstrated on Data
Table 5 may be due to the small universe of First Amendment cases
(four). In addition, the voting patterns charted on Data Table 5 have
tended to be relatively volatile.' Perhaps because of these
considerations, factor analysis suggests that First Amendment cases
this Term are not reliable indicators of the individual Justices' (and
the Court's) conservative/liberal bias.9°
Justices Thomas and Scalia tend to display similar voting
patterns in First Amendment cases. 9' The voting patterns of Justices
Ginsburg and Stevens also display rather high levels of correlation.
Data Table 6: Equal Protection Claims93
Data Table 6 and Chart 6 show a liberal trend in the decision of
Majority, Split and Unanimous Equal Protection cases.9' However,
the small universe of cases (five) and factor analysis (which suggests
that Equal Protection cases are the least reliable indicators of
conservative/liberal bias this Term95), render any conclusions based
on Data Table 6 somewhat tenuous. Nevertheless, the voting
patterns revealed in Data Table 6 are interesting.
The table demonstrates a rather unusual rank order, with
traditionally conservative Justices (including the Chief Justice and
Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas) holding the four top "liberal"
positions on the chart, while traditionally liberal members of the
Court (including Justices Breyer, Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg) hold
down the conservative bottom. This remarkable voting pattern is
almost certainly due to the nature of the Equal Protection cases heard
89. See infra Data Table 5 (between the 1993 Term and the 2001 Term, the outcome
of Majority decisions on Data Table 5 has ranged from a low of no cases decided in favor
of a First Amendment claim to a high of 100%, with most Term-to-Term results
evidencing relatively dramatic point shifts).
90. See infra Part V.
91. See infra Regression Table 5.
92. See infra Regression Table 5.
93. Cases decided for the claim: Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). Cases decided against the claim: City of Cuyohoga Falls v.
Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188 (2003); Grfitter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003); Fitzgerald v. Racing, 539 U.S. 103 (2003). Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003),
involved a question decided in favor, as well as a question decided against, the state: state
affirmative action program must survive strict scrutiny-against the state; state affirmative
action program survives strict scrutiny-for the state. See supra note 51.
94. See infra Data Table 6 and Chart 6.
95. See infra Part V.
i'2. A
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by the Court this Term-as well as closely correlated patterns of
voting displayed by several pairs of Justices.
In Grutter v. Bollinger,96 and Gratz v. Bollinger,"' the Court was
faced with claims-brought by non-minority plaintiffs-that state
attempts to balance the racial composition of university student
bodies violated the Equal Protection Clause. In these cases, the
typically "conservative" Justices voted in favor of the Equal
Protection claims (a "liberal" result under the terms of this Study)
while the typically "liberal" Justices voted against the claims (a
"conservative" result). 98
In addition to "pole switching," the Study reveals an unusual
cluster of correlated voting behaviors by the Justices in Equal
Protection cases. Justices Ginsburg and Souter display perfectly
correlated voting behavior on Data Table 6. 9 In addition, the voting
patterns of three additional pairs on the Court-Justices Thomas and
Scalia, Justices Breyer and Souter, and Justices Breyer and
Ginsburg-are also closely correlated."°  The voting patterns of
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor in Equal Protection cases, finally,
tend to move in tandem.'0 ' These closely correlated voting patterns,
combined with the "reverse discrimination" claims heard this Term,
probably account for the counter-intuitive ranking of the Justices on
Data Table 6 for 2002.
96. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
97. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
98. In Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306, Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, O'Connor, Souter, and
Stevens all voted in a traditionally conservative manner, or against the Equal Protection
claim, and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist all voted in a
traditionally liberal manner, or for the Equal Protection claim. The Justices voted
similarly in Gratz, 539 U.S. at 244, wherein Justices Ginsburg and Souter voted against the
Equal Protection claim and Justices Breyer, Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas and
Chief Justice Rehnquist voted for the Equal Protection claim. Justice Stevens would have
dismissed the claim for lack of standing and therefore abstained from casting a vote
concerning the Equal Protection claim.
99. See infra Regression Table 6. Last Term, the voting patterns of three pairs of
Justices were perfectly correlated. 2001 Study, supra note 1, at 342. In addition to Justices
Ginsburg and Souter, the voting patterns of Justices Breyer and Souter and the patterns of
Justices Breyer and Ginsburg were perfectly correlated. Id.
100. See infra Regression Table 6.
101. See infra Regression Table 6 (showing that Justices Kennedy and O'Connor's
voting patterns have a correlation score of .93 and an r2 score of .85).
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Table 7: Statutory Civil Rights Cases'02
Data Table 7 and Chart 7 show slight liberal movement for the
Court in Statutory Civil Rights cases. 3 The Justices voted for the
claim in Majority decisions 40.0% of the time, as compared to last
Term's 26.7%. They voted for the claim in Split decisions 50.0% of
the time, as compared to last Term's 33.3% of the time. Finally, the
Court voted for the claim in Unanimous decisions 33.3% of the time,
as compared to last Term's 28.6%.
As with Data Table 6, the rank order of the Justices on Data
Table 7 is somewhat unusual. Traditionally "conservative" Justices
(including the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia) hold "liberal"
positions at the top of the chart, while traditionally "liberal" Justices
hold down the "conservative" bottom. Indeed, the unusually
"conservative" voting patterns displayed by Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, Stevens and Souter on Data Table 7 all represent statistically
significant departures from their past behavior.'"'
Nevertheless, the unusual ranking of the Justices on Data Table
7 may be a momentary aberration. As with Equal Protection claims,
the universe of Statutory Civil Rights cases was small (five) and factor
analysis does not place this table among the most reliable indicators
of conservative/liberal bias.'5 Furthermore, there are only two voting
patterns revealed on Data Table 7. Seven of the nine Justices voted
for the claim 40.0% of the time, while the remaining two Justices-
Stevens and Souter-voted for the claim 20.0% of the time.
Accordingly, no one Justice is really much more "conservative" or
"liberal" than any other Justice on Data Table 7.
The voting patterns of Justices Breyer and Stevens and Justices
Ginsburg and Souter are highly correlated. 1°6
102. Cases decided for the claim: Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003);
Georgia. v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003). Cases decided against the claim: Clackamas
Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003); Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone
Indians, 538 U.S. 701 (2003); Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280 (2003).
103. See infra Data Table 7 and Chart 7.
104. See infra Mean Table 7. Justice Thomas' voting pattern also departs from his past
practice in a statistically significant manner, although he departs in a liberal direction. Id.
105. See infra Part V.
106. See infra Regression Table 7.
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Table 8: Jurisdiction
0 7
Data Table 8 and Chart 8 reveal moderate conservative
movement in the Court's voting behavior on jurisdictional issues. °
Although the Court demonstrated a 10-point liberal movement in the
outcome of Split decisions, this was offset by 12.1 and 20-point
conservative movements in the outcome of Majority and Unanimous
decisions. Conservative movement is also confirmed by the fact that
four Justices with statistically significant departures from past voting
behaviors-Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Thomas and Scalia-voted
more conservatively on Data Table 8 this Term than last year.1"
Individually, the most significant change in voting behavior is
Justice Stevens' 35.7 point decrease in his support of federal
jurisdictional claims.110 In keeping with tradition, Justice Scalia holds
the bottom, most conservative position on Data Table 8 as the Justice
voting least often in favor of expanding the Court's power-a position
he has held every year but one since the inception of this Study."
Regression analysis demonstrates that the voting patterns of
Justices Ginsburg and Souter are closely correlated on questions of
jurisdiction."' The voting patterns of these two Justices are also
correlated in Criminal/Federal, Equal Protection and Statutory Civil
Rights cases.
1 13
107. Cases decided for the claim: Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522 (2003); Sell v.
United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003); Charles Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003); Roell v.
Withrow, 538 U.S. 580 (2003); Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003);
United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 456 (2003); Pierce County Wash.
v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129 (2003); Fitzgerald v. Racing, 539 U.S. 103 (2003); Jinks v. Richland
County, 538 U.S. 456 (2003); Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113 (2003). Cases decided against
the claim: Syngenta v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28 (2003); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539
U.S. 444 (2003); Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468 (2003); Pacifica Health Sys. v.
Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003); Nat'l Park Hospitality v. Dep't of Interior, 538 U.S. 803 (2003);
United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003); INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (2003);
U.S. v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71 (2002); Howsom v. Dean Wittier Reynolds Inc., 537 U.S. 79
(2002).
108. See infra Data Table 8 and Chart 8.
109. See infra Mean Table 8. Justice O'Connor's voting pattern demonstrated
statistically significant liberal movement this Term. Id.
110. See infra Data Table 8.
111. See 1996 Study, supra note 1, at 74.
112. See infra Regression Table 8.
113. See infra Regression Tables 4, 6, 7.
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Table 9-Federalism Cases
114
Data Table 9 and Chart 9 show slight liberal movement from last
Term. In the Majority and Split decisions, the Court voted 7.1 points
more liberally than last Term, while in the Unanimous category the
Court voted 4.2 points more conservatively.
Three Justices-including the Chief Justice and Justices
O'Connor and Souter-demonstrated statistically significant changes
in voting behavior on Data Table 9.115 All three of these Justices
voted more liberally (that is, against a claim of state government
authority) than in 2001.116
This Term, the ranking of the Justices reveals a traditional
alignment of the Court, excepting the positions of Justice Ginsburg
and Justice O'Connor. The top four "conservative" Justices (voting
most often in favor of the state) were Justices Thomas, Scalia,
Kennedy, and-surprisingly-Justice Ginsburg. "7  Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer follow
these Justices.
Anticipated voting behaviors were rather accurate for Data
Table 9: all Justices voted within 17.1 points of their anticipated
scores."8 The anticipated voting scores for Justices Thomas and
O'Connor deviated by 2 points or less."9 The anticipated score for
the outcome of Majority decisions deviated from the actual score by
only 0.4 point.1 20
The voting patterns of Justices Breyer and Souter demonstrate a
high degree of correlation.
12
1
114. Cases decided in favor of the state: Lockeyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003);
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003); Pharm. Research v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (2003);
Ky. Ass'n. of Health Plans v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003); City of Cuyohoga Falls v.
Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188 (2003); Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S.
51 (2002). Cases decided in favor of the U.S.: Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254 (2003); State
Farm Mutual v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 406 (2003); Am. Ins. Ass'n. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S.
396 (2003); Entergy La. Inc. v. La. Public Serv. Comm'n., 539 U.S. 39 (2003); Hillside
Dairy v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59 (2003); Yellow Trans. v. Michigan, 537 U.S. 36 (2002).
115. See infra Mean Table 9.
116. See infra Data Table 9.
117. Justice Ginsburg voted against substantive due process in State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
118. See infra Data Table 9.
119. See infra Data Table 9.
120. See infra Data Table 9.
121. See infra Regression Table 9.
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Table 10: Swing-Vote Cases
122
Data Table 10 and Chart 10 indicate voting scores for the sixteen
cases that were decided by a margin of one vote. Because of the
narrow voting margin, Swing-Vote cases may well be the most
reliable indicator of the Court's position on the conservative/liberal
spectrum. Data Table 10 this Term reveals a liberal trend - even
though conservative coalitions still controlled the outcome of more
than 50% of the Swing-Vote cases heard by the Court.
This Term, conservative coalitions controlled the crucial fifth
vote 56.3 % of the time. However, the Justices with liberal tendencies
were not far behind-controlling the outcome in seven of the sixteen
closely divided cases decided this Term. Moreover, last Term
conservative coalitions determined the decision of 68% of all cases
decided by a single vote. Conservative coalitions, therefore, lost
nearly 12 points this Term.
Furthermore, review of the outcomes of Swing-Vote cases for the
past nine Terms suggests that the decisional power of conservative
coalitions may have peaked. In the 1999, 2001 and 2002 Terms,
conservative coalitions possessed marked power (deciding 61.5%,
60.0%, and 68.0% of the Swing-Vote cases those years, respectively).
The 56.3% figure chalked up this Term is the lowest ebb of this four-
Term conservative "run." Conservative coalitions last controlled
56.3% of closely divided cases in the 1996 Term - just before losing
control of Swing-Vote cases for two years to liberal coalitions in 1997
and 1998. Thus, while conservative coalitions held sway this Term,
decisional momentum may now favor the liberal wing of the Court.
The current Court may be conservative in the decision of Swing-Vote
cases, but its conservative tendencies are unsteady and perhaps
diminishing.
For the second year in a row, Justice O'Connor is the Court's
122. Swing-vote cases reaching a conservative outcome: Brown v. Legal Found. of
Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Lockeyer v.
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003); Sattazhan v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101 (2003); Ewing v.
California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003); Charles Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003). Swing-vote
cases reaching a liberal outcome: U.S. v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 436
(2003); Am. Ins. Assoc. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306; Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003); Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003);
Charles Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003); Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580 (2003).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), and Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003),
involved swing votes where one issue was decided by a "conservative" coalition while
another issue was decided by a "liberal" coalition. See supra note 51.
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most influential swing voter.
123 This Term she voted with the majority
in an unprecedented 100% of closely 'divided cases. 
This single
statistic renders Justice O'Connor the most powerful member 
of the
Court. Should she decide to retire, her replacement 
would be the
most significant personnel change on the current Court.
Following Justice O'Connor, the Chief Justice is the next 
most
influential member of the Court. This Term he voted 
with the
majority in 62.5% of closely divided cases. Justice Kennedy, 
who in
past years vied with Justice O'Connor for the spot as the Court's 
most
influential "swinger," 12
4 this Term is tied for third place with Justices
Souter and Breyer. Justice Stevens was the Justice least likely 
to vote
with the majority, voting only 37.5% of the time with the majority.
123. See infra Data Table 10.
124. See 1996 Study, supra note 1, at 96, 97 ("For the 
fourth year, Justice Kennedy is
the Court's most influential swing voter, voting with the 
majority 81.3% of the time ....
'[Als Justice Kennedy votes, so votes the Court.' "); see 
generally, 2000 Study, supra note 1.
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V. Category Analysis
Beginning in the 1996 Term, we began to analyze the
effectiveness of this Study's categories in measuring liberal and
conservative tendencies and trends. As might be expected, some
categories turn out to be more reliable indicators of ideological
tendencies than others.
Some categories, although dividing the Court into
liberal/conservative blocs, may "change polarity" depending on the
specific issues presented. For example, contrast the votes of generally
liberal Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer and Souter in Hill v.
Colorado"5 with their votes in Los Angeles v. Alameda Books,
Incorporated"6 In Hill, these Justices voted "conservatively" against a
First Amendment claim that would have invalidated a buffer zone
between protesters and clients of abortion clinics. On the other
hand, in Alameda Books, the same bloc voted "liberally" in favor of a
First Amendment claim that would have invalidated a city ordinance
limiting the concentration of adult entertainment businesses.
2
1 It is
possible that the specific context of the First Amendment claims-i.e.,
whether the claim was asserted in an abortion rather than an
obscenity context-influenced the "conservative" versus "liberal"
votes cast by these Justices. First Amendment cases, as a result, may
provide a less reliable indication of a Justice's ideological leanings
over time than another category of cases. (This Term, First
Amendment cases are ranked as the fifth most reliable category
among nine.)
The reliability of other categories may be influenced by a small
sample size. Data Table 5, which collects the results from cases
involving Equal Protection claims, is a good example. The number of
Equal Protection issues decided each Term tends to be small;
29 this
year, only five cases raised such a claim.' Because a single vote in
these categories may account for many percentage points, these
categories demonstrate highly volatile (and therefore less reliable)
ideological movements from Term to Term. (Equal Protection
125. 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
126. 535 U.S. 425 (2002).
127. 530 U.S. at 735 (6-3 decision) (Souter, O'Connor, Ginsburg, Breyer, JJ.,
concurring).
128. 535 U.S. at 453 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
129. There were no cases involving Equal Protection claims in the 2001 Term. 2001
Study, supra note 1, at 365.
130. See supra Data Table 5.
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claims, this Term, are the least reliable indicators of ideological
movement.)
In order to determine which categories best differentiate
between the voting patterns of more liberal and more conservative
Justices, we have applied a statistical tool known as factor analysis. 3'
By applying this tool, we have determined that a primary factor may
be extracted from the Study's categories over the entire life of the
Study that accounts for more of the variance revealed by the data on
Tables 1 through 9 than any other factor.132 We interpret this "Factor
1" as liberal/conservative bias because that is what this Study purports













According to this ranking, the "Criminal/State Party" category is
the most reliable indicator of liberal/conservative leanings over time,
while Equal Protection is the poorest. Liberal/conservative bias may
play a relatively reliable role in votes tabulated on Data Tables 1
(Civil/State Party), 9 (Federalism), and 4 (Criminal: Federal Party).
The information on Data Tables 5 (First Amendment), 8
(Jurisdiction), 7 (Statutory Civil Rights), 2 (Civil/Federal Party) and 6
(Equal Protection) may be less heavily influenced by the
liberal/conservative predilections of the individual Justices.
131. For more information regarding factor analysis, see infra Appendix B.
132. We extract a single factor via principal components analysis and employ a QMAX
rotation to achieve this result.
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VI. Frontier Analysis
Attempting to quantify the magnitude of a Justice's liberal or
conservative tendencies and to identify trends in such tendencies over
time is challenging for a variety of reasons. One challenge already
discussed is that of choosing appropriate tests and assessing their
validity. Another is dealing with inconsistency in the nature of cases
appealed to the Court from one Term to the next and the Court's
selection of which cases it will decide. With varying parameters such
as these, is there any meaningful way to quantify, analyze and
compare the Justices' inclinations? One potentially useful method is
frontier analysis.133
Frontier analysis focuses on the Justices' relative scores rather
than their absolute scores. Boundaries or "frontiers" are defined by
the highest and lowest scores in each category and each combination
of categories. Each Justice is then evaluated relative to the
established frontier. By adjusting the relative weights allocated to
each category, the frontier can be adjusted to reflect each category's
reliability-as determined by the factor analysis described in Part V.
We present liberal and conservative frontier data for the Court
in Frontier Analysis Tables and Charts 1-4. Two versions of each
frontier are presented. In Tables 1 and 2, we constrain the weights
applied to each category according to the factor analysis hierarchy in
Part V. On these tables, weights are chosen for each Justice that
produce the highest frontier score for him or her, subject to the
limitation that Equal Protection (the least reliable category) cannot
receive more weight than Civil/Federal Party (the next least reliable
category), Civil/Federal Party cannot receive more weight than
Statutory Civil Rights, and so forth, moving upward from the least
reliable category set out in Part V. Tables 3 and 4 apply no weighting
constraints at all, choosing for each Justice those weights that present
him or her in the most conservative or liberal light possible. Each
table lists a "% of Frontier" score for each Justice. Those with a
score of 100% reach the frontier by employing the category weight
distribution shown in the category columns. Scores less than 100%
indicate that the most conservative/liberal score the Justice could
obtain with optimal weighting places him or her at the indicated
percentage of the way toward the frontier. In some cases, an optimal
combination of weights may place a Justice beyond the frontier. This
condition is known as "superefficiency" and is noted in the charts
133. For more information regarding frontier analysis, see infra Appendix B.
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when present.
Frontier Charts 1 and 2 show the constrained scores for each
Justice over the course of this Study in graphical form. Near the
bottom of each chart is an indication of new Justices as they replace
outgoing Justices on the Court. Although former Justices' scores are
not indicated, they contributed to the determination of the liberal and
conservative frontiers during Terms in which they sat on the Court.
Frontier Charts 3 and 4 show each Justice's range of frontier
scores during the course of this Study. They are easier to read than
the line graphs and give a clearer picture of the Justice's relative
positions and score ranges overall. They do not, however, show any
trend information.
Frontier Analysis Table 1 shows Justice Thomas as the most
conservative Justice and Justices Breyer and Stevens tied for least
conservative. Frontier Chart 2 shows Justice Stevens as the most
liberal of the Justices and Justice Thomas as the least liberal. Justice
Thomas is the sole "superefficient" Justice on the conservative chart
this Term, while Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer are all
superefficient on the liberal chart.
Frontier Charts 1 and 3 show that Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Kennedy, Scalia, O'Connor and Thomas have all reached the
conservative frontier at some point during the Study. In fact, the
Chief Justice dropped below it this Term for only the third time.
Frontier Charts 2 and 4 clearly display Justice Stevens' superefficient
liberal tendencies. In fact, he so dominates the liberal frontier that
only three other Justices (Breyer, Ginsburg and Souter) have
managed to reach the frontier during the course of the Study.
[31:4
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V. Conclusion
This Term's data-as with last Term-reveal continued
polarization and voting instability on the Court.1 4  Consider the
following:
1. The Court is having substantial difficulty speaking with a
unanimous voice: Only two categories of cases, Civil/State and
Civil/Federal, were decided with predominantly Unanimous
opinions. In Criminal/State and First Amendment cases, the bulk of
the cases were decided by Split opinions.'36 In the remaining
categories, the division between Split and Unanimous opinions was
about equal.
1 37
2. The voting patterns of the Justices departed frequently from
past practice: This Term, on eight of the ten data tables, more than
half of the members of the Court voted in a manner that departed, in
a statistically significant fashion, from their past voting behavior.'
While statistically significant swings in voting behavior from year-to-
year may be due to many factors (including small sample size and the
peculiarities of particular cases), the fairly substantial number of
statistically significant voting movements this Term may indicate that
the Justices are having some difficulty holding a steady course as they
navigate their way through the Court's workload.
3. The data tables reveal consistent ideological bloc voting: Data
Tables 3, 4 and 7 display the expected conservative/liberal voting
blocs on the Court-with generally conservative Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas, joined by the Chief Justice, holding
conservative positions, and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Souter and
134. See 2001 Study, supra note 1, at 383 (noting polarization and voting instability).
135. See supra Data Table 1 (Civil/State)(16 of 25 cases decided by unanimous opinion;
9 by split opinion); Data Table 2 (Civil/Federal)(9 of 11 cases decided by unanimous
opinion; 2 by split opinion).
136. Data Table 3 (5 of 17 cases decided by Unanimous opinion; 12 by Split opinion);
Data Table 5 (1 of 4 cases decided by Unanimous opinion; 4 by Split opinion).
137. See supra Data Table 4 (Criminal/Federal)(3 of 6 cases decided by unanimous
opinion; 3 by split opinion); Data Table 6 (Equal Protection)(3 of 5 cases decided by
unanimous opinion, 2 by split opinion); Data Table 7 (Statutory Civil Rights)(3 of 5 cases
decided by unanimous opinion, 2 by split opinion); Data Table 8 (Jurisdiction)(12 of 22
cases decided by unanimous opinion, 10 by split opinion); Data Table 9 (Federalism)(8 of
14 cases decided by unanimous opinion; 8 by split opinion).
138. See supra Mean Table 1 (Civil/State)(6 Justices); Mean Table 2 (Civil/Federal)(6
Justices); Mean Table 4 (Criminal/Federal)(8 Justices); Mean Table 5 (First
Amendment)(8 Justices); Mean Table 6 (Equal Protection)(5 Justices); Mean Table 7
(Statutory Civil Rights)(5 Justices); Mean Table 8 (Jurisdiction)(5 Justices); Mean Table
10 (Swing-Vote)(6 Justices).
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Stevens holding liberal slots.'39 There are surprises in the rank order of
the Justices on some tables. For example, on Data Tables 1 and 2,
traditionally liberal Justices are found near the conservative top,
while traditionally conservative Justices are found at the liberal
bottom.' ° The situation is reversed on Data Table 6, where
traditionally conservative jurists hold the liberal top and liberals hold
the conservative bottom.14' These unusual rankings, however, may be
explained by the nature of the cases considered by the Court; on
these tables, the Court decided cases in which conservative outcomes
appealed to politically liberal jurists and vice versa.'42 If this is correct,
six of the Study's ten tables provide some evidence of ideological
polarization.
4. In spite of evident polarization, the Court oscillates between
conservative and liberal outcomes: As noted, the Court's voting
behavior continues to demonstrate ideological poles. With such
behavior, one might expect the Court to display a fairly consistent
voting stance. That has not been true. Last Term, the Court moved
in a conservative direction, reversing the modest liberal trend of the
2000 Term. 43 This Term, that conservative trend reverses course, with
the Court moving liberally in six of nine categories. This vacillation-
which has taken place despite the presence of identifiable voting
blocs-suggests that those blocs are experiencing some difficulty in
"holding their ideology together."
5. The conservative Rehnquist Court may be losing steam: The
Court's vacillation between conservative and liberal outcomes
suggests that the much-touted conservatism of the Rehnquist Court
may be waning. Furthermore, Data Table 10 suggests as much. That
table, which lists the voting patterns of the Justices in 5/4 cases, does
not rank the Justices within the traditional "conservative/liberal"
voting blocs shown on Data Tables 3, 4 and 7 (and 1, 2 and 6 for that
matter). Instead, the five "top slots" on the chart-held by the
Justices who vote most often with the majority-are occupied by
Justice O'Connor, the Chief Justice, Justice Kennedy and liberal
Justices Souter and Breyer.'" Justice Stevens holds down the bottom
139. See supra Data Tables 3, 4, 7.
140. See supra Data Tables 1, 2.
141. See supra Data Table 6.
142. See supra discussions of Data Tables 1, 2 and 6.
143. 2001 Study, supra note 1, at 382-83.
144. See supra Data Table 10. Justice Breyer reaches the constrained liberal frontier
this Term (and scores, in fact, a "superefficient" score of 107%), whereas Justice Souter
131
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of the chart-as the least influential member of the Court in close
cases-while conservative Justices Scalia and Thomas are tied with
liberal Justice Ginsburg as the next least influential Justices.14 ' Data
Table 10, in short, demonstrates that the traditional
conservative/liberal blocs are not "holding together" in closely
divided cases. Conservative coalitions seem to be losing steam.
6. Justice O'Connor has become more liberal and is now "the
vote to get" in closely decided cases: Justice O'Connor, as she was last
Term, is clearly the decisive vote in contentious cases. In last year's
Study, she voted with the Court majority in 84% of closely divided
cases. 146 This Term, she cast the deciding vote in 100% of these
cases-and conservative coalitions lost nearly 12 points of control.
147
These figures suggest that Justice O'Connor may be somewhat more
likely to vote with a liberal bloc than in the past (a possibility
supported by frontier analysis, which demonstrates that Justice
O'Connor comes closer to the constrained liberal frontier than she
does to the constrained conservative frontier" ).
This year's Study reveals a United States Supreme Court that is
divided into two uneasy camps, with neither side holding a position of
sustained dominance. The Court speaks with a divided voice, and the
individual Justices frequently cast (at least in a statistical sense)
somewhat unexpected votes. Despite its polarization, the Court does
not consistently reach either liberal or conservative results. Rather, it
seems to drift in a conservative direction one Term and reverse that
course the next. This unsteady drift belies any claim that the Court is
a conservative monolith.
One point seems clear. Justice O'Connor holds a position of
unusual importance. The replacement of any Justice on a Court this
polarized and unstable could have a significant impact. The
replacement of Justice O'Connor, however, would unquestionably
alter-perhaps dramatically-the voting patterns tracked by this Study.
reaches 96% of the way to the constrained liberal frontier. See supra Frontier Analysis
Table 2.
145. See supra Data Table 10. Justice Ginsburg reached the constrained liberal
frontier this Term with a superefficient score of 108%. See supra Frontier Analysis Table
2. Justice Scalia reaches 95% of the way to the constrained conservative frontier; Justice
Thomas is the sole justice to reach the constrained conservative frontier with a
superefficient score of 118%. See supra Frontier Analysis Table 1.
146. 2001 Study, supra note 1, at 370.
147 See supra Data Table 10.
148. Justice O'Connor reaches 90% of the constrained "liberal frontier," but only goes
84% of the way toward the constrained "conservative frontier." See supra Frontier
Analysis Tables 1, 3.
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APPENDIX A
1. The Universe of Cases
The only cases included in the database are those cases decided
by full opinion. Decisions on motions have been excluded even if
accompanied by an opinion. Cases handled by summary disposition
are included only if they are accompanied by a full opinion of the
Court and not if the only opinion is a dissent. Cases decided by a
four-four vote resulting in affirmance without written opinion have
been excluded. Both signed and unsigned per curium opinions are
considered full opinions if they set forth reasons in a more than
perfunctory manner. Cases not fitting within any of these categories
are not included in the database for any of the tables.
2. Cases Classified as Civil or Criminal
The classification of cases as civil or criminal follows commonly
understood definitions. Generally, the nature of the case is clearly
identified in the opinion. Only occasionally does a case pose a
problem of classification. No cases in 2001 raised such a question.
3. Cases Classified by Nature of the Parties-Data Tables 1 through 4
Cases are included on Data Tables 1 through 4 only if
governmental and private entities appear as opposing parties. This is
necessarily true of criminal cases. Civil cases are excluded from these
tables if they do not satisfy this criterion. The governmental entity
might be the United States government or one of its agencies or
officials or, with respect to a state government, one of its political
subdivisions. A suit against a government official in a personal
capacity is included if that official is represented by government
attorneys, or if the interests of the government are otherwise clearly
implicated. In instances of multiple parties, a civil case is excluded if
governmental entities appear on both sides of the controversy. If
both a state and a federal entity are parties to the same suit on the
same side with only private parties on the other, the case is included
on Data Tables 1 and 2. A case is included more than once on the
same table if it raises two or more distinct issues affecting the
outcome of the case and the issues are resolved by different voting
alignments.
4. Classification by Nature of the Issue-Data Tables 5 through 9
A case is included in each category of Data Tables 5 through 9
[Itl *A
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for which it raises a relevant issue that is addressed by written
opinion. One case may thus be included on two or more tables. A
case is also included more than once on the same table if it raises two
or more distinct issues in the category affecting the disposition of the
case and the issues are resolved by different voting alignments. A
case is not included on a table if an issue raised by one of the litigants
is not addressed in any opinion.
Identification of First Amendment and Equal Protection issues
poses no special problem since the nature of each claim is expressly
identified in the opinion. Issues of freedom of speech, press,
association, and free exercise of religion are included. However,
Establishment Clause cases are excluded since one party's claim of
religious establishment is often made against another party's claim of
free exercise or some other individual right, thus blurring the issue of
individual rights.
Statutory civil rights included on Data Table 7 are limited to
those invoking the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of
1965 and other civil rights statutes expressly barring discrimination on
the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, religion, age or physical
handicap. Actions brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 are included
if the substantive right asserted is based on a federal statute, or if the
issue involves the application of 42 U.S.C. section 1983 to the case at
hand. However, 42 U.S.C. section 1983 actions are excluded if the
substantive right asserted is based on the United States Constitution
and the issue relates to that constitutional right. The purpose of this
exclusion is to preserve the distinction between constitutional and
non-constitutional claims.
For Data Table 8, jurisdictional questions are defined to include
not only jurisdiction per se, but also standing, mootness, ripeness,
abstention, equitable discretion and justiciability. Jurisdictional
questions are excluded if neither party challenges jurisdiction and no
member of the Court dissents on the question, even though the Court
may comment on its jurisdiction.
Federalism cases on Data Table 9 are limited to those cases in
which there were issues raised by the conflicting actions of federal
and state or local governments. Common examples of these issues
are preemption, intergovernmental immunities, application of the
Tenth and Eleventh Amendments as a limit on federal government
action and federal court interference with state court activities (other
than review of state court decisions). Issues of "horizontal"
federalism or interstate relationships, such as those raised by the
dormant Commerce Clause or the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
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are excluded from the table.
5. The Swing Vote Cases
Data Table 10 includes all cases where the outcome turns on a
single vote. This category includes five-four decisions and four-three
decisions, if any, as well as five-three and four-two decisions that
reverse a lower court decision. Affirmances by a vote of five-three or
four-two are not included because a shift of one vote from the
majority to the minority position would still result in affirmance by a
tie vote. A case is included more than once in the table if it raises two
or more distinct issues affecting the disposition of the case and the
issues are resolved by different voting alignments.
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APPENDIX B
Study Methodology
This Study seeks to quantify three characteristics of Supreme
Court voting behavior: voting trends, mean voting percentages and
relationships among the Justices' voting patterns. The following
sections explain the statistical methods employed in this Study and
how test results should be interpreted.
A. Scores
Each score in this Study is simply the percentage of times a
Justice voted in favor of the party or claim specified by the category.
Some categories contain fewer samples than others, resulting in
coarser score increments. For example, a category including ten cases
during the term will have the potential for eleven different scores
(0% through 100%, in 10% increments), while a category with only
one case during the Term will provide only two score possibilities
(0% and 100%).
B. Predictive Modeling
Data in this project were fitted to an Auto Regressive Integrated
Moving Average (ARIMA) forecasting model.
149 This model is useful
in circumstances where, as in this Study, a single variable (a Justice's
score) is to be forecast based only on its present and prior values with
no other explanatory variables. ARIMA is an acronym for Auto
Regressive Integrated Moving Average. The model is most easily
explained by starting in the middle of the acronym:
Integrated: This term refers to a differencing process
which operates in a manner similar to
differentiation of a continuous function in
calculus. The goal is simply to remove trend
from the time series data by subtracting each
score in the time series from the next score in
the series. The resulting differences form a
new time series. This operation may be
repeated successively until a trendless or
"stationary" series results. Our model employs
149. ARIMA computer modeling was accomplished using MINITAB® statistical
software with p = 1, d = 1, and q = 1. For more information regarding the ARIMA (p,d,q)
model, see PETER KENNEDY, A GUIDE TO ECONOMETRICS 248-49 (3d ed. 1992).
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only one differencing operation.
Auto-Regression:
Once the series has been made stationary, an
autoregressive parameter may be
determined. ° This parameter seeks to relate
each data point in the stationary series to the
data point immediately preceding it through
multiplication. That is:
X, = AX,_,
where X, is the value of the data series at point
t, A is the autoregressive parameter, and X,, is
the value of the data series point immediately
preceding X,.
Because we are dealing with a series of data
points, however, a single parameter will almost
never precisely produce the relationship just
described for all data point pairs. Some error
is inevitable. We therefore seek to determine
that parameter which produces the least total
error when applied to the entire series."'
Moving Average:
A second parameter is determined that relates
the value of each series element X to the error
between the estimated value and the actual
value of the previous element X,-,. That is:
X, = -Bx,,
where -B is the Moving Average parameter.
The value of this parameter is also optimized
to minimize its total error when applied to the
series.
150. Many statistical models employ more than one autoregressive parameter due to
various properties of the data series. Our data uses single-parameter (first order) AR and
MA models.
151. This is accomplished by applying least squares estimation, i.e., the parameter is
chosen such that the sum of the squared errors is minimized.
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Synthesis:
The previous operations are combined into the
equation:
X, = Ax,.1-Bx,.,+ E,
where E, represents the residual error
remaining between the calculated and actual
values of X,. This final equation is used to
predict the series score for the upcoming Term.
C. Mean Testing
We use a "student's t test"' 12 to determine whether this Term's
score (X2), departs in a statistically significant manner from the mean
of all previous Terms' scores (X1). Essentially, we treat these two
numbers as the means of two independent samples drawn from the
universe of all scores in the category.'53 We hypothesize that Y'is also
the true mean of the population V', and we set up this hypothesis (the
"null" hypothesis) and its corresponding alternative hypothesis as
follows:
Ho: = The "null" hypothesis, i.e., X does not
significantly shift p from its previous value on
the real number line. Therefore, the two
samples are statistically equivalent.
H: == X The alternative hypothesis, i.e., X significantly
shifts p from its previous value on the real
number line. Therefore, the two samples are
not statistically equivalent.
We then set out to prove the alternative hypothesis, within a
152. For a practical perspective on this procedure, see DAVID S. MOORE & GEORGE
P. MCCABE, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRACTICE OF STATISTICS 500-18 (2d ed. 1993). See
also HOGG & CRAIG, supra note 6.
153. This approach introduces potential bias problems due to non-random sampling,
small samples, and dissimilar sample standard deviations. Nevertheless, we use the test to
impose some measure of discipline in analyzing the available data.
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certain confidence interval,"' by rejecting the null hypothesis.155 This is
accomplished by calculating the following statistic:
X2-,U
The result of this equation (t) is compared to the entry on a t-
distribution table corresponding to the confidence interval desired (0)
and the appropriate number of degrees of freedom (n-k).'56 If the
absolute value of t is greater than the table entry, H is rejected and
we say that the Justice has shown a statistically significant change in
voting behavior this Term.
D. Correlation
Relationships between two Justices' voting records may be
mapped over a two-dimensional Cartesian plane as in Figures 1 and 2.
Figure 1 shows a high degree of positive correlation (R2=0.7921)
between the voting percentages of the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia
for the Equal Protection category. The points all fall close to an
upward sloping line. On the other hand, Figure 2 shows that the
voting percentages of the Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens show only
a very weak, negative correlation (R2=0.0473). The points are widely
scattered about a downward sloping line. Statistically significant
correlations between and among Justices' Term-to-Term voting
patterns are shown in Regression Tables 1-10. The first number in
each pair is the Pearson correlation coefficient. The second number
is an r2 statistic, which is a more reliable measure of the actual level ofcorrelation."l 7
154. We have selected a confidence interval of 95%. Because this is a two-tailed test
X 2 may shift p in either a positive or negative direction = .025.
155. A full description of the logic behind this seemingly convoluted procedure is
beyond the scope of this article. However, its purpose is to control Type I (or alpha)
error. For a complete explanation, see MOORE & MCCABE, supra note 152.
156. k = the number of parameters being tested; here, p is the only hypothesized
parameter, so k = 1.
157. The r 2 statistic is an estimate of Vl, the true measure of correlation between the
dependant variable and its independent counterpart(s). The "adjusted" r 2 value in the
tables is a result of the computer's attempts to filter out any bias in the original r 2 result.
F11, *A.-
I.
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Figure 1
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Figure 2
The correlation measured in this case is in the Term-to-Term
movement of Justices' scores. A high correlation between two
Justices does not mean that they necessarily vote together often. It
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simply means that their scores tend to move up and down together
from one Term to another. Also note that correlation in no way
implies causation.
E. Factor Analysis
Factor analysis has long been used by psychologists who attempt
to identify characteristics of personality or intelligence by using
batteries of tests. Their challenge has been to develop tests that
validly measure the characteristics of interest. This Study similarly
attempts to measure the Justices' liberal and conservative leanings by
"testing" their disposition of certain types of cases.
We performed a factor analysis of the Study categories using
Minitab software. The factor loadings presented were obtained by
extracting a single factor, using principal components analysis and
applying a QMAX rotation to the data. A full description of the
theory and mathematics underlying factor analysis is beyond the
scope of this appendix, but several books on the subject are available
that provide reasonably simple explanations of this complex process. "'
F. Frontier Analysis
Frontier analysis can probably best be described with an
example. Suppose four individuals are competing for the title of







Alan would argue that the title should go to the best croquet
player because he has scored highest in the croquet category, while
Debbie would argue that the best marbles player should win because
each has scored highest in that category. On the other hand, Betty
would argue that each sport should receive equal weight, because her
combined score with equal weightings would be higher than either
Alan's or Debbie's, i.e., Betty would score (7 x 0.5) + (7 x 0.5) = 7,
while Alan would score (9 x 0.5) + (2 x 0.5) = 5.5, Chuck would score
158. See generally DENNIS CHILD, THE ESSENTIALS OF FACTOR ANALYSIS (2d ed.
1990).
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A, B, C, and D represent the athletes. The solid line connecting
points A, B, and D represents the athletic frontier, i.e., the boundary
beyond which no athlete has performed regardless of the relative
weights assigned to marbles and croquet. A, B, and D are located at
100% of the frontier. Moreover, B can be said to be super-efficient to
the extent her point lies beyond the line AD connecting the two
points adjacent to it on the frontier. A and D are also super-efficient
to the extent they lie beyond lines (not shown) connecting B with the
points at which the frontier meets each axis. C falls short of the
frontier regardless of the weights assigned to marbles and croquet.
However, an optimal set of weights may be selected such that C
"looks his best," i.e., he comes closest to reaching the frontier.
The same concept can be applied to the Court to determine
which Justice is "most conservative" or "most liberal." However,
instead of two dimensions (croquet and marbles), the Court analysis
includes nine dimensions (all Study categories except Swing Votes).
Although human minds have difficulty envisioning nine dimensions,
computers can handle the required calculations with ease. We
performed our analysis using Microsoft Excel's solver feature.
Although the formulas and procedures involved are straightforward,
a complete description of them is beyond the scope of this appendix.
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